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1. Introduction 
The literature discusses whether competition between schools increases the quality of 
educational outcomes. Friedman (1962) claimed already that school choice policies promise 
to align the incentives of school management with demand. Positive effects on educational 
outcomes can occur if students choose schools with higher quality levels. This increases the 
incentives for schools to invest in the quality of the primary process to improve educational 
outcomes. From a theoretical point of view, a negative effect of competition on quality is also 
possible. In practice many other characteristics influence school choice. If, for instance, 
students look more at choices of friends or the attractiveness of sport programs, the link 
between school choice and quality might be very different. Schools might choose to invest 
time and money in characteristics appreciated by potential students which are not related to 
the (direct) quality of education. In this case the effect of competition on educational 
outcomes might become negative as less time and money is present for the primary process. 
In addition, measuring and interpreting quality might not be straightforward and costless for 
students and their parents. Which effect dominates is a matter of empirical analysis. 
 Unfortunately, empirical analysis of the effect of competition on quality of educational 
outcomes is scarce due to the absence of real and large scale competition in many countries. 
A few examples make this clear. 
Hoxby (2000) uses the concept of Tiebout choice, parents choose between school 
districts based on the quality differences of schools, to test this hypothesis. Her result 
suggests that competition enhances quality for elementary and secondary education. 
However, Rothstein (2007) shows that her results are sensitive for construction of the 
competition variables and claims that alternative constructions yield insignificant results. 
Moreover, Rothstein (2007, p. 2034) finds that Hoxby’s specification is subject to selection 
bias because the sample excludes private school students. In Hoxby (2007) these criticisms 
are disputed, but the discussion is still unsettled. Even more important is that Tiebout choice 
is only a weak indicator for the effect of free school choice. Parents have to move to another 
district to be able to vote with their feet. Fully free choice results in much more competitive 
pressure as parents can choose other schools in and out of district without having to move 
house. Unfortunately, only evidence is present for small scale free choice or voucher 
programs as only a few countries in the world provide fully free choice for parents.  
Lavy (forthcoming), for example, analyses the effects of free school choice as an 
experiment in one of the districts of Tel Aviv (Israel) allowed parents to choose between 
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public schools both in and out of district. He finds significant positive effects of free school 
choice on the quality of public schools.  
Sandström and Bergström (2005), as a second example, show that the increased 
parental choice in Sweden since 1992 as a result of a voucher program supports the 
hypothesis that school results in public schools improve due to competition with independent 
schools. However, if competition is measured by the commonly used Herfindahl-Hirschman 
concentration index the results are sometimes negative and sometimes insignificant. Also in 
Sweden the voucher program is small as only 7% of students were enrolled in an independent 
school.  
Rouse and Barrow (2009, p. 22), after summarizing the literature on voucher programs, 
conclude that these small-scaled experiments cannot be used to test Friedman’s hypotheses 
and thus that “many questions remain about the potential long-term impacts on academic 
outcomes and about both the public and private sector responses to a large, permanent, and 
well-funded voucher program.”1 The Netherlands is one of the only countries in the world 
where such impacts currently can be measured as it has long experience with free choice, the 
role of both public and private schools is large and the funding is completely equal between 
all types of schools. 
  In the Netherlands the model of free parental choice between different types of schools 
is present after the historical national school dispute (‘schoolstrijd’) came to an end in 1917 
(Kossmann, 1978).2 After that period, parental choice and equal opportunities of public and 
private schools are even guaranteed in the Dutch constitution. Private primary and secondary 
schools are managed by independent non-profit boards, and abide by practically the same 
rules as public schools. Many, but not all, private schools have a religious background. 
Private schools are fully financed by the government at exactly the same level as public 
schools and for both based on the number of students. The Dutch system could in fact be 
characterized by a full voucher program with 100% funding. Parents are free to choose any 
public or private school in the country. Schools are in principle obliged to accept all students. 
The only exception the law permits is for religious schools to ask that parents agree with their 
                                                     
1 Rouse and Barrow (2009) conclude that “Keeping these limitations in mind, the best research to date finds 
relatively small achievement gains for students offered education vouchers, most of which are not 
statistically different from zero.” 
2 A country with a similar system is Belgium, where the system appeared in 1958 after also a prolonged battle 
between religious and secular political parties (Kossmann, 1978, p. 273). 
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denomination. In practice, only a few, especially Protestant, schools use this exception. 
Selection with respect to the a priori quality of students is never allowed. This is an important 
difference with voucher programs in other countries, where school often can select the 
students they want. Free choice is used very often as currently 71% of students are at private 
schools.  
After the introduction of free parental choice, a large number of private schools entered 
the market. However, currently new schools start only very occasionally. The reason for this 
is that parents can easily start a new school location as long as they proof that the 
denomination they present (or educational method like Dalton or Montessori they believe in) 
is not yet present in their surroundings and that enough students are available that want to 
attend a school with such a denomination. Given the long history, nearly all types of schools 
are already present.3 This means that competition in the Netherlands occurs between existing 
school locations and not with entrants. This is a very important institutional characteristic as 
we use the number of school locations as an instrument for competition in the market to test 
for endogeneity problems. This could be important as competition between school locations 
measured by concentration indices based on market shares (in our case the Herfindahl-
Hirschman-Index) might be endogenous with respect to quality as a lower quality might lead 
to changes in market shares if higher quality school attract students. The number of school 
locations, however, is not endogenous in the Netherlands as low quality in a market is not a 
possible reason for getting a permission to start a new school location. The number of school 
locations in the Netherlands is therefore exogenous with respect to quality. This is a major 
difference with US markets where entry is very often the result of dissatisfaction with 
existing school quality (Hoxby, 2000). 
Given the long history of competition between schools in the Netherlands, one would 
expect that effects on quality, if present, are visible. However, the effect of competition on 
quality has never been systematically analyzed for the Netherlands. In this paper we fill this 
gap based on data for secondary schools for the period 2002-2006. We use datasets of the 
Dutch Ministry of Education and the national monitoring agency for education 
(“Onderwijsinspectie”). We measure school quality by three achievement variables: the 
average score in the nationwide final exams, the percentage of students that obtain a diploma 
and the percentage of students finishing on-time. For all three measures we find evidence for 
                                                     
3 The only exception at present is the start of a few Muslim schools. 
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a negative effect of competition on quality, which is quite small. This effect is robust for 
alternative specifications and sensitivity analyses, including endogeneity correcting IV-
estimations. It shows that the effect is dominated by small and medium sized schools and by 
schools which do not have a Protestant or Catholic denomination.  
The article is organized as follows. In the second section we discuss the methodology 
and the available data. In the third section the estimation results are presented. In the fourth 
section the robustness of the results is discussed. In the fifth section conclusions are drawn.  
 
2. Methodology and Data 
Our main methodology is an econometric test of the effect of competition intensity on the 
educational outcomes of school locations. In the Netherlands a distinction is made between 
school boards (or competent authorities for public schools), schools, school locations and 
education types. It is possible that a school board comprises several schools and that a school 
has several locations, while each location can supply five education types in one or more 
location. Schools are not obliged to provide all education types and they often choose to 
provide a subset of the five types. 
Students finish primary education at the average age of 12 and enroll in one of five 
levels of secondary education. Sorted at the level of education these are pre-vocational 
secondary education at three levels (VMBOBA, VMBOKA and VMBOGT), senior general 
secondary education (HAVO) or pre-university education (VWO). VMBO with duration of 
four years is intended as preparation for secondary vocational education. The BA level is the 
lowest level, aimed at profession oriented learning. The highest VMBO level, GT, is theory 
based and is necessary for students who want to follow the last two years of HAVO after 
finishing VMBO. The intermediate level, KA, combines elements from both BA and GT. 
HAVO with duration of five years is intended as preparation for higher professional 
education (HBO) and is also necessary for students who want to follow the last two years of 
VWO after finishing HAVO. VWO with duration of six years is intended to prepare for 
university. In most schools the final choice between the school types is made after the first 
two or three years of secondary education, while a first broad streaming (e.g. a combination 
of HAVO/VWO or VMBO) is based on a nationwide test at the end of primary school and on 
advice of the primary school teachers.  
Our main hypothesis is that locations compete with each other for students and that this 
competition affects educational quality. Managers have an incentive to attract more students 
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to increase scale as their salary is often influenced by the size of the location and school. 
Currently the minimum manager salary of the smallest schools is 101,000 dollar per year, 
while managers of the largest school can earn up to 255,000 dollar per year (1.47 dollar is 1 
euro). Traditionally, board members were unpaid. Increasingly, however, board members 
also get a salary, which is often coupled to the size of schools (varying from 4,000 dollar for 
the smallest schools to 17,000 dollar for the biggest schools). As schools are not allowed to 
ask a contribution from parents and the revenues from the government are fixed per student, 
the way to increase scale is by increasing the number of students. The question is how this 
affects the quality of education. As long as quality is a dominant parameter in the choice set 
of students (and their parents), a positive effect could be expected. Schools with higher 
achievements are then able to attract more students. A negative effect, however, could occur 
if other parameters determine the choice set and schools invest in these parameters instead of 
in quality (see introduction). Which effect dominates is a matter of empirical analysis. 
We estimate a panel model using both the cross-section and the time-related variation. 
For each achievement indicator we estimate the following equation: 
 
Qi,t = βCIi,t + γSi,t + λPi,t + ci + dt + εi,      (1) 
 
where Qi,t measures achievement of the location i in year t, CIi,t measures competition 
intensity, Si,t is a vector of location characteristics, Pi,t a vector of socio-economic variables of 
the neighborhood where the location is located, ci are time-invariant school fixed effects, dt 
are time fixed effects (with 2002 as benchmark) and εi is an error term.  
Based on administrative data of the national monitoring agency for education we 
distinguish between three school performance measures as the dependent variable: the 
average central exam score based on a national exam in the final year that is the same for all 
Dutch schools, the percentage of graduated students and the percentage of students graduated 
on-time. All variables are measured at the location level i for each year t and per education 
type. Data are available for nearly all locations. The total panel includes a maximum of 
10,047 observations as we have data for 553 locations, for four (VMBO: 2003-2006) or five 
years (HAVO and VWO: 2002-2006) and for five education types. In Table 1 the summary 
statistics are shown for the overall sample and the five education types. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics quality variables, years 2002-2006 
 Central exam score Share on-time graduated Share graduated
Overall 
- Mean 6.42 0.76 0.94
- Minimum 4.10 0.09 0.07
- Maximum 7.90 1.00 1.00
- Standard deviation 0.33 0.16 0.07
- Observations 10,047 9,183 10,041
    
VWO    
- Mean 6.41 0.64 0.93
- Observations 2,057 1,945 2,057
 
HAVO 
- Mean 6.24 0.60 0.90
- Observations 1,973 1,893 1,973
 
VMBOGT 
- Mean 6.35 0.85 0.95
- Observations 2,702 3,022 2,698
 
VMBOKA 
- Mean 6.45 0.86 0.96
- Observations 1,671 1,177 1,670
 
VMBOBA 
- Mean 6.73 0.89 0.95
- Observations 1,644 1,146 1,643
 
 
We take as a measure for competition intensity the so-called Herfindahl-Hirschman-
Index (HHI). The HHI is based on the share (si) of the school locations enrollment in total 
enrollment within a pre-defined geographic area per education type:4 
i
n
i
sHHI   1 2 (2) 
School locations within a distance of 10 kilometers are taken into account.5 The HHI varies 
between zero and one. A value of (nearly) zero indicates that there are many relatively equal-
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sized school locations in the relevant market. A value of one indicates that the school is a 
monopolist. In the estimations we use a negative HHI (–HHI) as this is easier to interpret (an 
increase in competition corresponds with an increase of this measure).  
 In Table 2 descriptive statistics of the HHI indexes are given. On average the HHI has a 
value of 0.35, indicating that the average location competes with two other locations. An HHI 
lower than 0.1 reflects a high level of competition and is present for 11% of all locations. An 
HHI between 0.1 and 0.2, indicating moderately concentrated markets, is present in 26% of 
all cases. 38% of the school locations have an index between 0.2 and 0.5 and these markets 
are concentrated. For 26% of the locations markets are highly concentrated with a HHI of 0.5 
or more. According to this measure, nearly half of these locations is a monopolist (HHI=1). 
These figures mean that competition differs a lot per region.  
 The effect of competition on the quality of education is estimated using the general 
HHI-index measured at the school location level per education type. As an alternative 
measure for competition intensity we use in sensitivity analysis the number of competitors in 
the market and the HHI-index measured at the school level. 
 The first location characteristic we correct for in the estimations is scale.6 In our model 
we include the scale of the board (the number of schools per board), the scale of the school 
which the location is part of (the total number of students) and the scale of the location at the 
education type level (the number of students per education type).7 The second location 
characteristic is related to the provided type of education. We include dummies with value 1 
if one of the five types is provided, with VWO as the benchmark. See Table 3 for descriptive 
statistics. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
4 For the market shares (si) we take into account students who are in the last two (VMBO and HAVO) and last 
three (VWO) years. The reason that student numbers of earlier years are disregarded is that students are not 
yet streamed finally and precisely to education types. 
5 In US-literature the HHI is mostly based on a municipality or a district. In the Netherlands competition takes 
place within a certain geographic area as municipalities are much closer to each other. The distances 
between school locations are calculated using a standard route planner. The average distance Dutch students 
travel according to Statistics Netherlands is 10 kilometers. 
6 The effects of scale are not influenced by the correlation with competition. Estimations without competition 
variables or scale variable do not lead to other conclusions, while the correlation between competition 
intensity and the scale of schools, locations and boards is only 0.05, -0.06 and 0.00. 
7 We tested for multi-collinearity between these variables and did not find any indication for this. We excluded 
the scale of the location summed over education types as this variable has a very high correlation with scale 
per education type. 
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Table 2a: Share of school locations by level of competition 
 HHI Locations Share of all locations
High level of competition < 0.1 1,067 0.11
 0.1 to 0.2 2,579 0.26
Low level of competition 0.2 to 0.5 3,806 0.38
 0.5 to 1.0 1,495 0.15
Monopoly 1.0 1,100 0.11
Total 10,047 1.00
 
Table 2b: Descriptive statistics competition variables   
 Average Max Min  St.dev. N
HHI at location level 0.35 1.00 0.04 0.28 10,047
- 21 biggest cities 0.15 0.83 0.04 0.09 3,282
- Top 25% population density1 0.18 1.00 0.04 0.13 2,511
- Bottom 25% pop. density1  0.56 1.00 0.04 0.31 2.502
- 1st quintile scale schools2 0.33 1.00 0.04 0.27 1,814
- 2nd quintile scale schools2 0,31 1.00 0.04 0.27 2,084
- 3rd quintile scale schools2 0.35 1.00 0.05 0.27 1,970
- 4th quintile scale schools2 0.41 1.00 0.05 0.29 2,049
- 5th quintile scale schools2 0.38 1.00 0.05 0.27 2,130
- Public 0.36 1.00 0.04 0.28 2,895
- Catholic 0.39 1.00 0.05 0.29 1,858
- Protestant 0.35 1.00 0.05 0.27 1,664
- Neutral 0.34 1.00 0.05 0.27 1,731
- Other 0.32 1.00 0.04 0.26 1,945
HHI at school level 0.39 1.00 0.05 0.28 10,048
Number of competitors 5.46 35 0 5.55 10,047
1. Per location. 2. With respect to number of students. 
  
No socio-economic data on characteristics of the student population are available at the 
location level. Therefore we use data that is available for the zip code where the location is 
located.8 We include the following socio-economic characteristics: the number of non-
western foreigners per 100 inhabitants (foreigners), the average income per inhabitant in 
1,000 euro (income) and population density. The only demographic information available at 
the location level for the whole period is gender (the share of girls). The data for the socio-
                                                     
8 Zip codes in the Netherlands are alphanumeric, consisting of four digits (followed by two letters). These four 
digit zip codes are geographic areas of towns or municipalities and the Netherlands has more than 4,000 of 
such areas. The average size of this area is 10.3 squared kilometres.  
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economic characteristics for each zip code are obtained from Statistics Netherlands. See 
Table 3 for descriptive statistics. Note that we also include school and year fixed effects to 
correct for not-observed heterogeneity. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics other variables  
 Average Max Min St.dev. N
Scale location (students) 219 1,553 10 164 10,047
Scale school (students) 1,713 10,492 25 1,494 10,047
Scale board (schools) 13 74 1 19 10,047
Education level (share):  
- VWO 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.40 10,047
- HAVO 0.20 1.00 0.00 0.40 10,047
- VMBOGT 0.27 1.00 0.00 0.44 10,047
- VMBOKA 0.17 1.00 0.00 0.37 10,047
- VMBOBA 0.16 1.00 0.00 0.37 10,047
Girls (share) 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.09 10,047
Foreigners (share) 0.10 0.80 0.00 0.11 10,047
Income (*1000) 13.0 29.0 8.0 2.4 10,047
Population density1 4,027 26,046 46 3,033 10,047
Year 2002 0.09 1.00 0.00 0.28 10,047
Year 2003 0.21 1.00 0.00 0.41 10,047
Year 2004 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.42 10,047
Year 2005 0.24 1.00 0.00 0.42 10,047
Year 2006 0.23 1.00 0.00 0.42 10,047
1. Inhabitants/km2 
 
3. Results 
Table 4 presents the estimations results based on OLS. For all three achievement indicators a 
significant negative relationship is found between quality and competition. These results 
suggest that more competition decreases the quality of education. However, the effects are 
not large. If competition increases from monopoly (HHI=1) to full competition (HHI=0) the 
average central exam score decreases with 0.05. With the same change, the percentage of 
graduated students decreases with 1.1%-point and the percentage on-time graduated students 
decreases with 1.7%-point. A smaller change in competition intensity is more probable, 
especially because in the Netherlands competition takes place between existing school 
locations and not with entrants. Assume, for example, that a dominant firm with 60% market 
share looses students to four other schools with 10% market share each with the ex-post 
 11
result that all schools have equal market shares (resulting in a HHI decrease from 0.40 to 
0.20). In this case the average central exam scores decrease with 0.01, while the percentage 
of graduated and on-time graduated students decreases with respectively 0.2 and 0.3%-point. 
This means that, although we find a significant relationship between competition and quality, 
the effects are rather small. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results OLS model 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.049 (0.019)*** -0.017 (0.007)** -0.011 (0.004)** 
Scale location (*1000) 0.091 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.109 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.390 (0.010)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.017 (0.039) 0.031 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.240 (0.054)*** 0.005 (0.021) -0.007 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.437 (2.316) -1.765 (0.914)* -0.582 (0.537) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.063 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.30 (0.048)*** 0.60 (0.019)*** 0.92 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047  9,183  10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with 
school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
 
 Scale effects are found only for the central exam score if the scale of location and 
school increases. These effects are small and positive. If the scale of the location is increased 
with 1,000 students the central exam score rises with 0.09. This effect is 0.02 if the scale of 
the school increases with the same number. 
For time effects, the exam score declines over time but the percentage of on-time 
graduated students increases over time. Thus, there are fewer students with delay, but the 
price is a lower exam score.  
Turning to the socio-economic characteristics, we find significant negative results on 
the central exam score if a school is located in a neighborhood with a high percentage of non-
western foreigners. The share of graduated students is lower when the population density 
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increases. It should be noted, however, that we include detailed fixed effects (per school), 
which might interact with these variables. Indeed, models without fixed effects show highly 
significant coefficients for foreigners, income and population density for all three quality 
measures. We find no indication that the gender effect is important for the central exam 
score, but the share of (on-time) graduated is higher with a larger share for girls. 
 
4. The robustness analysis  
It could be argued that the effect of competition is not homogeneous. First, a difference could 
be present between urban and rural areas. As competition is generally higher in urban areas, it 
could be possible that our main results are in fact driven by differences between urban and 
rural areas. To test this, we include an additional effect for the 21 biggest cities and for the 
locations located in areas with a relative low (bottom 25%) and high (top 25%) population 
density. The HHI is indeed much lower in the 21 big cities with an average value of 0.15 
(Table 2b). This is comparable to the level of 0.18 for the locations located in the 25% 
locations with the highest population density. The bottom 25% locations have an HHI of 
0.56. Still, we do not find support for the heterogeneity hypothesis (Table 5, models 1 and 
2).9 None of the coefficients are significant for a separate competition intensity effect for big 
cities and areas with a low or high population density. 
 A second type of possible heterogeneity is related to the scale of school locations. It 
could be argued that smaller school locations have a higher need to attract additional students 
and thus compete more fiercely. One reason for this is that small schools profit more from 
scale economies in costs and reputational effects if their scale increases. A second reason is 
that small schools can loose their permit if the scale drops below a certain level. Finally, the 
wage level of managers is often coupled to the scale of schools, providing incentives to scale 
up, especially for managers of smaller schools. To test this we include, first, an additional 
variable measuring the multiplicative effect of HHI and the scale of schools and, second, 
                                                     
9 Full estimation results for the models presented in Table 5 and 6 are in Appendix B. 
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Table 5: Estimation results competition variables alternative specifications 
  
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
Nr. Model Competition variables Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
0 OLS (Table 4) -HHI -0.049 (0.019)*** -0.017 (0.007)** -0.011 (0.004)** 
1 Separate effect for 21 biggest cities -HHI -0.050 (0.019)*** -0.017 (0.007)** -0.011 (0.004)** 
  -HHI * 21 biggest cities -0.102 (0.066) 0.041 (0.027) -0.023 (0.015) 
2 -HHI -0.055 (0.022)** -0.016 (0.008)* -0.015 (0.005)*** 
 -HHI * Bottom 25% population density 0.010 (0.019) -0.002 (0.007) 0.006 (0.004) 
 
Separate effect for bottom and top 25% with 
respect to. population density 
-HHI * Top 25% population density -0.041 (0.046) 0.008 (0.019) -0.001 (0.011) 
3 Multiplicative effect with scale school -HHI -0.152 (0.026)*** -0.035 (0.009)*** -0.015 (0.006)** 
  -HHI * Scale school (*1000 students) 0.048 (0.008)*** 0.009 (0.003)*** 0.002 (0.002) 
4 -HHI * Schools 1st quintile (students) -0.182 (0.030)*** -0.038 (0.011)*** -0.023 (0.007)*** 
 -HHI * Schools 2nd quintile (students) -0.058 (0.031)* -0.046 (0.011)*** -0.013 (0.007)* 
 -HHI * Schools 3rd quintile (students) -0.139 (0.036)*** 0.001 (0.014) -0.022 (0.008)*** 
 -HHI * Schools 4th quintile (students) -0.041 (0.029) 0.000 (0.011) 0.004 (0.007) 
 
Effect per scale class schools with respect to the. 
number of students (1st quintile are smallest 
schools, 5th quintile are largest schools) 
-HHI * Schools 5th quintile (students) 0.038 (0.028) -0.002 (0.011) -0.011 (0.006)* 
5 Effect per denomination -HHI -0.091 (0.025)*** -0.022 (0.009)** -0.014 (0.006)** 
  -HHI * Catholic 0.090 (0.036)** 0.017 (0.013) 0.010 (0.008) 
  -HHI * Protestant 0.090 (0.025)*** 0.012 (0.009) 0.005 (0.006) 
  -HHI * Neutral 0.054 (0.033) 0.004 (0.012) 0.007 (0.008) 
  -HHI * Other -0.019 (0.020) -0.007 (0.007) -0.005 (0.005) 
6 Effect trend -HHI -0.070 (0.030)** -0.041 (0.011)*** -0.011 (0.007) 
  -HHI * Trend 0.006 (0.007) 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.000 (0.002) 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with school fixed effects which are available upon request, results for 
other variables available on request. 
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Table 6: Estimation results competition variables sensitivity analysis 
  
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
Nr. Model Competition variables Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
0 OLS (Table 4) -HHI -0.049 (0.019)*** -0.017 (0.007)** -0.011 (0.004)** 
7 IV -HHI instrumented by number of competitors -0.048 (0.020)** -0.020 (0.007)*** -0.010 (0.005)** 
8 Alternative competition variable Number of competitors -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.003 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** 
9 Alternative competition variable -HHI at school level -0.064 (0.019)*** -0.018 (0.007)** -0.014 (0.004)*** 
10 Quadratic effect competition HHI -0.262 (0.071)*** -0.079 (0.027)*** -0.035 (0.016)*** 
  HHI2 0.175 (0.056)*** 0.051 (0.022)** 0.020 (0.013) 
11 Separate effect for high HHI HHI -0.080 (0.031)*** -0.025 (0.012)** -0.013 (0.007)* 
  HHI between 0.8 and 1.0 0.026 (0.021) 0.006 (0.008) 0.002 (0.005) 
12 No fixed effects per school -HHI -0.106 (0.013)*** -0.031 (0.005)*** -0.013 (0.003)*** 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with school fixed effects which are available upon request, results for 
other variables available on request. 
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replace the HHI by HHI’s in scale quintiles.10 We find indeed evidence for a relation between 
the effect of competition intensity and scale (Table 5, models 3 and 4). The coefficient for 
HHI is with -0.15 now three times as high for the effect on central exam score, but decreases 
if the scale of schools becomes larger. At the average scale (1,713 students) the effect is 
-0.069. The effect becomes zero for schools with a scale of about 3,000 students. For the 
share of on-time graduated students comparable effects are found. For the share of graduated 
students, however, the multiplicative effect is insignificant. In the specification with quintiles, 
it is clear that the effect is dominated by the first three quintiles. This means that the negative 
effect of competition on quality is dominated by small and medium sized schools. 
 A third type of possible heterogeneity is related to the denomination of schools. 
Students are in principle free to choose any school in the Netherlands. Certain private 
schools, however, have a special relationship with a subgroup of the inhabitants. Catholic 
schools, for instance, will be more attractive for students with a Catholic background. This 
might influence the real competition intensity schools feel. To test this, we include additional 
parameters for the HHI variable per type of private school. We distinguish between Catholic 
(18% of total), Protestant (17%), Neutral (17%) and Other (19%) private schools. This last 
group is the combination of several small denominations such as Orthodox Protestant, 
Anthroposophist and Islamic. We find evidence for a denominational effect for the central 
exam score (Table 5, model 5). Effects are zero for Protestant and Catholic schools, while the 
effects for other private and public schools are now higher (-0.09) than in the basic model. 
 A final type of possible heterogeneity is related to time. Newspapers and popular 
journals publish increasingly reliable information on the quality of schools and the quality 
variables of all schools are since 2004 also available on the internet. Furthermore, it might 
take time before enough students and their parents make use of this information and students 
and their parents might need time to get used to using this information properly. It could be 
argued, therefore, that the competition effect on quality changes over time as information on 
quality becomes better available for students and their parents. We test this by including an 
additional variable multiplying the HHI with a time trend. Only the estimations with the share 
of on-time graduated students results in a significant coefficient (Table 5, model 6). Here we 
                                                     
10 School locations are divided in five equal groups with respect to school size. These groups have cut-off points 
at respectively 360, 1,075, 1,765 and 2,507 students. We include also dummies for scale classes to prevent 
that possible non-linear scale effects are included in coefficients for multiplicative effects. 
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find evidence that the effect was larger at the beginning of our time frame. After six years, 
which lies outside our sample, the effect becomes zero. 
To analyze the robustness of the estimations we test for endogeneity. One could argue 
that there is also an effect of quality on competition. This is the case if low quality 
performance of schools invokes an increase in competition as it gives more possibilities for 
other schools to compete on quality. If this is the case, our OLS-estimations might be biased. 
An alternative for OLS is IV-estimation where the HHI is replaced by an instrument (as 
applied for instance by Sandström and Bergström (2005) and Hoxby (2000, 2007)). We use 
the number of competitors in the market as an instrument.11 While market shares, and thus 
the HHI, might be endogenous to quality, this is not possible in the Netherlands for the 
number of competitors. As the introduction shows, entry of school locations is (nearly) non-
existent. More important is that a low quality in a certain market can never be a reason to 
start a new school location. If this would be the reason for certain parties to start a new school 
location, permission is not granted. Only when denominations (or specific educational 
methods) are not present in the relevant market, such permission is granted. The number of 
school locations is, therefore, exogenous by law. This is a major difference with US markets 
where entry is very often the result of dissatisfaction of existing school quality (Hoxby, 
2000). Table 6 present the results for the IV-estimator based on 2SLS estimation (model 7). 
We find that the reported negative effect of competition on quality is robust for endogeneity 
as all coefficients for the competition variables are not significantly different from the OLS-
estimates.  
Next, we test alternative assumptions for the competition variable. First, competition is 
measured by the number of school locations in the market. Second, competition is measured 
at the level of the school instead of the school location to reflect the case that competition 
takes place at school instead of location level. In both cases we find again a negative effect of 
competition on quality (Table 6, models 8 and 9). Third, we investigate whether there is a 
non-linear effect between competition and quality by including a quadratic term for the HHI 
variable as in Aghion et al. (2005). Although the coefficients for quadratic effects are significant for 
the central exam score and the share of on-time graduated students, the negative effect is still present 
                                                     
11 To be precise, we use (1/(number of competitors+1)) as an instrument to get a measure between 0 and 1 that is 
comparable with the HHI variable, which makes comparison of coefficients with our OLS-estimates easier. 
Alternative specifications with for example just the number of competitors or (1/(number of competitors+3)) 
all result in negative and significant coefficients. 
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in nearly all cases (Table 6, model 10). Only when the HHI decreases in the range of 1.0 
(monopoly) to 0.8 a very small increase in quality (0.01) is observed. Estimations with a separate 
effect for this HHI range, however, shows that this is the result of overshooting given the quadratic 
specification (Table 6, model 11). Although all three coefficients for the separate effects are 
negative, they are never significant. Finally, we estimated models without fixed effects for 
schools and find that coefficients are significant and negative, but much higher for the central 
exam score and the share on-time graduated (Table 6, model 12). This means that panel 
estimations are important as fixed effects can correct for not-observed heterogeneity. 
Summarizing, the found negative relationship between competition and quality for the 
Dutch secondary schools is rather robust, but is higher for small and medium sized schools 
and for schools which are not Catholic or Protestant.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In the literature an interesting debate on the effect of competition between schools takes 
place. It is argued that competition enhances quality. However, if quality plays a minor role 
in the choices made by students and their parent the opposite effect could be possible. The 
empirical tests of the hypothesis that competition improves quality are based on countries 
where only a low level of competition is present. Tiebout choice, small scale voucher 
programs and experiments do not necessarily shed light on the long-term effects of fully free 
parental choice. In the Netherlands free parental choice has been the leading principle since 
the beginning of the previous century, which could be characterized as a full voucher 
program with 100% funding. Nevertheless, a systematic analysis of the effect of this free 
parental choice on educational achievements did not take place and this paper fills this gap 
for secondary education. Our conclusion is that there is a robust negative relation between 
competition and the quality of educational outcomes, but that the effect is small. This effect is 
robust for alternative specifications and sensitivity analyses, including endogeneity correcting 
IV-estimations. It shows that the effect is dominated by small and medium sized schools and 
by schools which do not have a Protestant or Catholic denomination.  
These findings contradict with especially Hoxby (2007) and Lavy (forthcoming). Given 
the fact that only our analysis is based on fully free choice, which has been available on a 
large scale and for a long time, it could be argued that our results give a better approximation 
of the long term effects. However, the results are consistent if in Israel and the US quality of 
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educational outcomes plays a much larger role in school choice compared with the 
Netherlands. 
In future research there are several avenues to explore. First, future research should use 
broader measures of quality. It could be that competition has a positive effect on other quality 
aspects than educational outcomes. Lavy (forthcoming) provides first evidence for such 
effects as behavioral outcomes improved after the introduction of free choice in Tel Aviv. 
Second, it is interesting to investigate the effects of competition on quality for primary 
schools as well, where distance is a more important feature of school choice. Third, if data 
are available for more years, it is possible to investigate whether the found relationship still 
holds in a larger time span. The effect of public discussion and increasing transparency using 
internet might diminish the negative effects after some years if the role of quality in choosing 
schools increases.  
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Appendix A. List of variables 
Competition (-HHI) Minus Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index at location level 
(sum of market shares of locations within radius of 
10km) 
Competition (# 
competitors) 
Number of competitors at location level within radius 
of 10 km. 
Competition (-HHI school 
level) 
Minus Herfindahl-Hirschman-Index at school level 
(sum of market shares of schools within radius of 
10km) 
Biggest 21 cities Dummy with value 1 if location is situated in one of 
the 21 biggest cities (these cities have more than 
118,000 inhabitants) and zero otherwise 
Population density Number of inhabitants per square kilometer 
Bottom 25% pop. density  Dummy with value 1 if location is situated in a 
postcode area with a low population density (75% of 
areas have higher density) and zero otherwise 
Top 25% pop. density  Dummy with value 1 if location is situated in a 
postcode area with a high population density (75% of 
areas have lower density) and zero otherwise 
Scale location  Number of students per location 
Scale school  Number of students of the school where the location is 
part of 
Scale board Number of schools per board where the location is 
part of 
HAVO Dummy with value 1 if location provides education at 
HAVO level and zero otherwise 
VMBOGT Dummy with value 1 if location provides education at 
VMBOGT level and zero otherwise 
VMBOKA Dummy with value 1 if location provides education at 
VMBOKA level and zero otherwise 
VMBOBA Dummy with value 1 if location provides education at 
VMBOBA level and zero otherwise 
Girls Share of girls at location 
Foreigners Share of non-western foreigners at postcode level 
Income Income per inhabitant in euro at postcode level 
Catholic Dummy with value 1 if location has a Catholic 
denomination and zero otherwise 
Protestant Dummy with value 1 if location has a Protestant 
denomination and zero otherwise 
Neutral Dummy with value 1 if location has a Neutral 
denomination and zero otherwise 
Other Dummy with value 1 if location has another 
denomination than public, Catholic, Protestant and 
Neutral and zero otherwise   
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Appendix B. Estimation results sensitivity analysis 
 
Not for publication (might be made available at website) 
 
Tables give detailed results for estimations presented in Table 5 and 6. The number of 
the estimated models in Table 5 and 6 equals the number of the table headings in this 
Appendix (e.g. details for model 1 in Table 5 are in Table B1). 
 
Table B1: Estimation results with separate effect competition variable for biggest 21 cities 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.050 (0.019)*** -0.017 (0.007)** -0.011 (0.004)** 
-HHI * Biggest 21 cities -0.102 (0.066) 0.041 (0.027) -0.023 (0.015) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.089 (0.028)*** 0.010 (0.011) -0.008 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.043 (0.013)*** 0.213 (0.005)*** 0.016 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.108 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.390 (0.011)*** 0.235 (0.004)*** 0.023 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.017 (0.039) 0.032 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.250 (0.054)*** 0.008 (0.021) -0.010 (0.013) 
Income (*1000) 1.275 (2.320) -1.705 (0.916)* -0.628 (0.538) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.045 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.060 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.046 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.292 (0.048)*** 0.603 (0.019)*** 0.917 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,026  9,163  10,020  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B2: Estimation results with separate effect competition variable for top and bottom 
25% population density 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.055 (0.022)** -0.016 (0.008)* -0.015 (0.005)*** 
-HHI * Bottom 25% pop. density  0.010 (0.019) -0.002 (0.007) 0.006 (0.004) 
-HHI * Top 25% pop. density  -0.041 (0.047) 0.008 (0.019) -0.001 (0.011) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.089 (0.028)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.008 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.213 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.108 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.390 (0.010)*** 0.235 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.019 (0.039) 0.031 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.242 (0.054)*** 0.005 (0.021) -0.008 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.471 (2.336) -1.772 (0.923)* -0.655 (0.542) 
Population density (*1000) 0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.063 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.046 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.296 (0.048)*** 0.602 (0.019)*** 0.918 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047  9,183  10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with 
school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B3: Estimation results with multiplicative effect HHI and scale schools 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI -0.152 (0.026)*** -0.035 (0.009)*** -0.015 (0.006)** 
-HHI*Scale school (*1000) 0.048 (0.008)*** 0.009 (0.003)*** 0.002 (0.002) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.095 (0.027)*** 0.010 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.037 (0.006)*** 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.045 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.112 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.393 (0.010)*** 0.235 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.005 (0.039) 0.028 (0.017)* 0.035 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.250 (0.054)*** 0.003 (0.021) -0.008 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.648 (2.313) -1.652 (0.915)* -0.575 (0.537) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.010)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.262 (0.048)*** 0.596 (0.019)*** 0.916 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B4: Estimation results with separate effect competition variable for quintiles schools 
with respect to the number of students (1st quintile are smallest schools, 5th quintile are 
largest schools). 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI*1st quintile -0.182 (0.030)*** -0.038 (0.011)*** -0.023 (0.007)*** 
-HHI*2nd quintile -0.058 (0.031)* -0.046 (0.011)*** -0.013 (0.007)* 
-HHI*3rd quintile -0.139 (0.036)*** 0.001 (0.014) -0.022 (0.008)*** 
-HHI*4th quintile -0.041 (0.029) 0.000 (0.011) 0.004 (0.007) 
-HHI*5th quintile 0.038 (0.028) -0.002 (0.011) -0.011 (0.006)* 
Scale location (*1000) 0.093 (0.028)*** 0.014 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Dummy 2nd quintile 0.049 (0.018)*** -0.009 (0.007) -0.001 (0.004) 
Dummy 3rd quintile 0.001 (0.024) 0.006 (0.009) -0.002 (0.006) 
Dummy 4th quintile 0.040 (0.027) -0.003 (0.010) 0.006 (0.006) 
Dummy 5th quintile 0.014 (0.034) -0.018 (0.013) -0.007 (0.008) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.040 (0.007)*** 0.005 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.055 (0.022)** 0.211 (0.008)*** 0.014 (0.005)*** 
VMBOKA 0.111 (0.010)*** 0.200 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.392 (0.010)*** 0.236 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls -0.003 (0.040) 0.020 (0.017) 0.033 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.254 (0.054)*** 0.002 (0.021) -0.009 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.634 (2.314) -1.502 (0.915) -0.584 (0.538) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.007 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.045 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.062 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.010)*** 0.074 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.235 (0.054)*** 0.598 (0.021)*** 0.916 (0.013)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with 
school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B5: Estimation results with separate effect competition variable for denominations 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI -0.091 (0.025)*** -0.022 (0.009)** -0.014 (0.006)** 
-HHI * Catholic 0.090 (0.036)** 0.017 (0.013) 0.010 (0.008) 
-HHI * Protestant 0.090 (0.025)*** 0.012 (0.009) 0.005 (0.006) 
-HHI * Neutral 0.054 (0.033) 0.004 (0.012) 0.007 (0.008) 
-HHI * Other -0.019 (0.020) -0.007 (0.007) -0.005 (0.005) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.094 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.019 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.031 (0.013)** 0.211 (0.005)*** 0.014 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.109 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.391 (0.010)*** 0.235 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.014 (0.039) 0.029 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.234 (0.054)*** 0.006 (0.021) -0.007 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.684 (2.320) -1.686 (0.918)* -0.541 (0.538) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.046 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.294 (0.048)*** 0.603 (0.019)*** 0.917 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B6: Estimation results with competition variable times trend 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI -0.070 (0.030)** -0.041 (0.011)*** -0.011 (0.007) 
-HHI * Trend 0.006 (0.007) 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.000 (0.002) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.090 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.109 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.391 (0.010)*** 0.235 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.017 (0.039) 0.031 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.243 (0.054)*** 0.001 (0.021) -0.007 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.503 (2.318) -1.619 (0.915)* -0.582 (0.538) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.010 (0.010) 0.027 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.015 (0.011) 0.050 (0.004)*** 0.006 (0.003)** 
Year 2005 -0.055 (0.013)*** 0.071 (0.004)*** 0.004 (0.003) 
Year 2006 -0.038 (0.014)*** 0.083 (0.005)*** 0.003 (0.003) 
Constant 6.290 (0.048)*** 0.595 (0.019)*** 0.917 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B7: Estimation results IV 2SLS model 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.048 (0.020)** -0.020 (0.007)*** -0.010 (0.005)** 
Scale location (*1000) 0.091 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.109 (0.010)*** 0.199 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.390 (0.010)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.017 (0.039) 0.031 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.241 (0.054)*** 0.006 (0.021) -0.008 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.413 (2.323) -1.679 (0.916)* -0.597 (0.539) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.296 (0.048)*** 0.600 (0.019)*** 0.918 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047  9,183  10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request, instrument is number of competitors. 
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Table B8: Estimation results with number of competitors as competition variable 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (# competitors) -0.012 (0.001)*** -0.003 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** 
Scale location (*1000) 0.082 (0.027)*** 0.008 (0.011) -0.009 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.022 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.149 (0.008)*** -0.034 (0.003)*** -0.031 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.062 (0.013)*** 0.219 (0.005)*** 0.019 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.101 (0.010)*** 0.197 (0.004)*** 0.025 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.384 (0.010)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.023 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.007 (0.039) 0.027 (0.017) 0.034 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.169 (0.054)*** 0.018 (0.021) 0.004 (0.013) 
Income (*1000) 6.485 (2.365)*** -0.683 (0.933) 0.222 (0.549) 
Population density (*1000) 0.004 (0.002)** -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000) 
Year 2003 0.010 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.014 (0.010) 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.007 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.057 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.005 (0.002)** 
Year 2006 -0.043 (0.010)*** 0.074 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002) 
Constant 6.289 (0.045)*** 0.607 (0.018)*** 0.918 (0.010)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,048  9,184  10,042  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated with 
school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B9: Estimation results with HHI at school level 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.064 (0.019)*** -0.018 (0.007)** -0.014 (0.004)*** 
Scale location (*1000) 0.092 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.144 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.041 (0.013)*** 0.213 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.108 (0.010)*** 0.198 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.389 (0.010)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.018 (0.039) 0.032 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.232 (0.054)*** 0.005 (0.021) -0.006 (0.012) 
Income (*1000) 1.892 (2.320) -1.747 (0.915)* -0.502 (0.538) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.010)* 0.045 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.010)*** 0.063 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.280 (0.048)*** 0.602 (0.019)*** 0.914 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.62  0.19  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B10: Estimation results with competition variable squared 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI -0.262 (0.071)*** -0.079 (0.027)*** -0.035 (0.016)** 
-HHI2 0.175 (0.056)*** 0.051 (0.022)** 0.020 (0.013) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.089 (0.027)*** 0.008 (0.011) -0.008 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
HAVO -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT 0.045 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.016 (0.003)*** 
VMBOKA 0.106 (0.01)*** 0.198 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.387 (0.011)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.023 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.016 (0.039) 0.030 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.212 (0.054)*** 0.013 (0.021) -0.004 (0.013) 
Income (*1000) 2.847 (2.359) -1.332 (0.932) -0.422 (0.547) 
Population density (*1000) 0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.000)** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.010) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.018 (0.010)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.007 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.060 (0.010)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.046 (0.011)*** 0.074 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.231 (0.052)*** 0.583 (0.020)*** 0.910 (0.012)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B11: Estimation results with separate competition variable for high HHI 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
-HHI -0.080 (0.031)*** -0.025 (0.012)** -0.013 (0.007)* 
-HHI (0.8<HHI<1.0) 0.026 (0.021) 0.006 (0.008) 0.002 (0.005) 
Scale location (*1000) 0.091 (0.027)*** 0.009 (0.011) -0.007 (0.006) 
Scale school (*1000) 0.021 (0.005)*** -0.001 (0.002) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0) 0.000 (0) 
VMBOGT -0.143 (0.008)*** -0.033 (0.003)*** -0.030 (0.002)*** 
VMBOKA 0.042 (0.013)*** 0.214 (0.005)*** 0.015 (0.003)*** 
VMBOBA 0.108 (0.01)*** 0.198 (0.004)*** 0.026 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.389 (0.011)*** 0.234 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls 0.016 (0.039) 0.030 (0.017)* 0.036 (0.009)*** 
Foreigners -0.232 (0.054)*** 0.007 (0.021) -0.007 (0.013) 
Income (*1000) 1.802 (2.334) -1.664 (0.923)* -0.554 (0.541) 
Population density (*1000) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0)*** 
Year 2003 0.008 (0.01) 0.024 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Year 2004 -0.019 (0.01)* 0.046 (0.003)*** 0.006 (0.002)*** 
Year 2005 -0.061 (0.01)*** 0.064 (0.003)*** 0.004 (0.002)* 
Year 2006 -0.046 (0.011)*** 0.073 (0.003)*** 0.003 (0.002) 
Constant 6.281 (0.049)*** 0.599 (0.019)*** 0.916 (0.011)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.63  0.11  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
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Table B12: Estimation results without fixed effects per school 
 Central exam score 
Share on-time 
graduated Share graduated 
 Coef St.error Coef St.error Coef St.error 
Competition (-HHI) -0.106 (0.013)*** -0.031 (0.005)*** -0.013 (0.003)*** 
Scale location (*1000) 0.254 (0.021)*** 0.082 (0.008)*** 0.023 (0.005)*** 
Scale school (*1000) -0.005 (0.002)** 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Scale board (schools) 0.001 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)*** 0.000 (0.000)*** 
HAVO -0.164 (0.009)*** -0.037 (0.003)*** -0.032 (0.002)*** 
VMBOGT -0.019 (0.010)* 0.220 (0.004)*** 0.016 (0.002)*** 
VMBOKA 0.098 (0.011)*** 0.205 (0.004)*** 0.028 (0.002)*** 
VMBOBA 0.370 (0.011)*** 0.240 (0.004)*** 0.024 (0.002)*** 
Girls -0.044 (0.033) 0.031 (0.015)** 0.025 (0.007)*** 
Foreigners -0.595 (0.034)*** -0.130 (0.013)*** -0.121 (0.007)*** 
Income (*1000) -4.140 (1.379)*** -3.090 (0.519)*** -1.541 (0.300)*** 
Population density (*1000) -0.005 (0.001)*** -0.004 (0.000)*** -0.002 (0.000)*** 
Year 2003 0.003 (0.012) 0.025 (0.004)*** 0.002 (0.003) 
Year 2004 -0.026 (0.012)** 0.046 (0.004)*** 0.006 (0.003)** 
Year 2005 -0.065 (0.012)*** 0.064 (0.004)*** 0.005 (0.003)* 
Year 2006 -0.047 (0.012)*** 0.074 (0.004)*** 0.004 (0.003) 
Constant 6.473 (0.031)*** 0.616 (0.012)*** 0.944 (0.007)*** 
R2 (within) 0.30  0.62  0.19  
Observations 10,047   9,183   10,041  
Notes: Standard errors in brackets, */**/*** means significance at 10%/5%/1%, models are estimated 
with school fixed effects which are available upon request. 
 
 
